Description
Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou defy theoretical humanities'' deeply-
entrenched resistance to engagements with the life sciences. Rather than
treat biology and its branches as hopelessly reductive and politically
suspect, they view recent advances in neurobiology and its adjacent
scientific fields as providing crucial catalysts to a radical rethinking of
subjectivity. Merging three distinct disciplinesâEuropean philosophy from
Descartes to the present, Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, and affective
neuroscienceâJohnston and Malabou triangulate the emotional life of
affective subjects as conceptualized in philosophy and psychoanalysis with
neuroscience. Their experiments yield different outcomes. Johnston finds
psychoanalysis and neurobiology have the potential to enrich each other,
though affective neuroscience demands a reconsideration of whether affects
can be unconscious. Investigating this vexed issue has profound
implications for theoretical and practical analysis, as well as
philosophical understandings of the emotions. Malabou believes scientific
explorations of the brain seriously problematize established notions of
affective subjectivity in Continental philosophy and Freudian-Lacanian
analysis. She confronts philosophy and psychoanalysis with something
neither field has seriously considered: the concept of wonder and the cold,
disturbing visage of those who have been affected by disease or injury,
such that they are no longer affected emotionally. At stake in this
exchange are some of philosophy''s most important claims concerning the
relationship between the subjective mind and the objective body, the
structures and dynamics of the unconscious dimensions of mental life, the
role emotion plays in making us human, and the functional differences
between philosophy and science.



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